Essentially, the doctrine is about preventing inconsistent behavior and ensuring a just outcome. Let`s look at some of the landmark decisions in India that clarify the scope of the doctrine of approval and disapproval. The doctrine of approval and disapproval is a type of estoppel that lies between estoppel by registration and estoppel in Pais. The doctrine of choice is based on the rule of confiscation, and the principle that one cannot approve and reject is inherent in it. The doctrine of election and the underlying doctrine of approval and representativeness is a rule of justice. If a person knowingly acquires the benefits of an instrument, he or she is prevented from denying the validity or binding effect of such an instrument. The second category described in Codrington v Codrington [1875] LR 7 HL 854 to 861-862 by Lord Cairns L.C. «If an act or will purports to make a general disposition of the property in favour of a person named therein, that person may not accept any benefit from the deed without at the same time confirming all its provisions and waiving any rights incompatible with them.» Interestingly, he notes that this follows the «well-established doctrine.» in Scottish law. to `approgate` and `condemn`».
This category of elections generally reflects the extent of approval and disapproval as traditionally used in Scotland. The concept of appprobate and repudiation could be seen as similar to the doctrine of the personal bar association in Scottish law. However, the criterion to be met for the personal bar is stricter. It requires that there be not only an inconsistency, but also the trust of another party (Personal Bar, Reid and Blackie, 1st ed., 2006, chapter 2). Therefore, it requires that you have made someone else believe by their behavior that a certain course of action has been chosen, which has led the other person to rely on it. Similarly, the doctrine of waiver, according to which a right may be expressly or implicitly waived by conduct, currently requires that there be confidence and conduct of questions based on waiver by another party (although this aspect has been criticized – see The Law of Contract in Scotland, McBryde, 3rd edition, 2007, paragraphs 25-16 et seq.). Thus, the concepts of personal bar and renunciation can currently be distinguished from apology and disapproval, but the common denominator is that of fairness and, as Bell points out, like personal bar, approval and disapproval are based on justice. Therefore, in England, the principle of appprobate and disapproval appears as an expression of the legal doctrine of choice, rather than as a legal doctrine in itself, as is the case in Scotland, and it has been treated as a more flexible principle of broader application than tradition in Scottish law. In addition, the principle of approval and representability is based on the maxim «allegans contraria non est audiendus», which means that when one expresses statements that contradict each other, the same thing is not heard. Given the voluntary use of licences and rejection in English cases over a longer period of time, it is perhaps surprising that this has been so rare in Scottish cases.
In this context, their fundamental presumption of application to Redding Park and Highlands and Islands airports (and subject to any appeal in these two cases) may reflect the catch-up process of the Scottish courts, and it is interesting to note that the English courts reflect the Scottish origin of the doctrine. While the Scottish courts` acceptance of extending the doctrine in Scotland beyond its traditional scope can be seen as pragmatic, it also seems compatible with logic and fairness. In future cases, however, further analysis could lead to a clearer legal basis for the extension of Scottish law. The judge weighted the MPB`s remarks that courts should be slow to establish that the doctrine of recognition and rejection should apply to issues dealt with in case law, which is an «approximate and ready» form of dispute resolution, often carried out by parties without legal representation, and when the manner in which a party presents its arguments should not be treated in such a way as to lead to clear elections that bind the parties. How they can present their case in the future. However, it noted that the issue in this case was not whether MPB should be bound by the way it presented its case in the decision, but rather by its more fundamental choice to apply a particular dispute settlement procedure. Follow us on Instagram and subscribe to our YouTube channel for more amazing legal content. Before ruling on either of the two issues, Véronique Buehrlen, Q.C., who served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, reiterated that section 67 challenges would be made through new de novo hearings on jurisdictional issues. While the arbitrator`s decision on jurisdiction may be taken into account, it has no probative or legal weight in the court`s decision. In Thacker Hariram Motiram v. Balkrishan Chatrabhu Thacker,[3] the High Court gave the appellant (tenant) one year to rule on the second appeal in an eviction case, provided that he undertook to renounce free possession within three weeks within the above-mentioned period. The applicant undertook, in accordance with the above-mentioned conditions, to leave the premises of the action before 31 December 1985, i.e.
after one year, if there is no «order to suspend the Supreme Court at that time, since I intend to appeal to the Supreme Court». It was held that, in view of this obligation, the applicant could not rely on the jurisdiction of that court under Article 136 of the Constitution and had to comply with the conditions of the obligation, and it was stated[4]: «This obligation, presented by the appellant after our opinion, is in flagrant contradiction with the oral obligation towards the learned judge, which led him to give a year of time. We do not wish to promote this type of practice in order to obtain from the Court a time limit for a plea concerning the presentation of the obligation and the different attitudes in applications under Article 136 of the Constitution. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Vidhi Shanker v. Heera Lal[5] and Ramchandra Jai Ram Randive v. Chandanmal Rupchand[6], its discretion under art.